The Case for War

The road to the Iraq War ran through 9/11 — but not directly. Iraq had nothing to do with the September 11 attacks. Saddam Hussein, a secular Baathist, despised Al-Qaeda's religious extremism. The CIA repeatedly told the administration there was no operational connection between Saddam and bin Laden.

But 9/11 changed the political calculus. For a group of neoconservative officials — Deputy Defense Secretary Paul Wolfowitz, Vice President Cheney, and others — Iraq represented the 'unfinished business' of the Gulf War. They had argued for Saddam's removal since the mid-1990s. Now they had an administration willing to act.

The public case centered on weapons of mass destruction. Some intelligence agencies assessed that Iraq retained prohibited programs, but the evidence was fragmentary, caveated, and sometimes based on unreliable sources; public presentations expressed greater certainty than the underlying record supported. UN inspectors returned in November 2002 and had not found active stockpiles when they were withdrawn before the invasion.

On February 5, 2003, Secretary of State Colin Powell appeared before the UN Security Council. His presentation — satellite images, intercepted communications, testimony from defectors — laid out the WMD case in detail. It was later discovered that almost all of it was wrong. Powell later called the speech 'a blot on my record.'

The US failed to win UN authorization for war. France and Russia threatened to veto. The US assembled a 'Coalition of the Willing' — 49 countries, though most contributed symbolically. Britain, under Tony Blair, committed substantial forces. Spain, Australia, and Poland sent troops. On March 20, 2003, the invasion began.