The Waiting

The Six-Day War began not on June 5 but three weeks earlier, with a crisis that built slowly and then catastrophically. On May 14, Egyptian forces began moving into the Sinai. On May 16, Nasser demanded the withdrawal of UN peacekeepers who had separated Egyptian and Israeli forces since the Suez Crisis. The UN Secretary General complied within 24 hours — handing Nasser the buffer that had kept the peace.

Nasser then closed the Straits of Tiran to Israeli shipping on May 22 — an act Israel had declared, in 1957, would be a casus belli. Israel's lifeline to Africa and Asia was cut. In Cairo, Baghdad, Damascus, and Amman, the rhetoric became increasingly genocidal. 'The battle will be total and our aim will be the annihilation of Israel,' announced Iraqi President Arif.

In Israel, the waiting was agonizing. The IDF was mobilized — reservists pulled from farms, hospitals, and offices. The economy ground to a halt. The government was seen as hesitant. On June 1, under intense public pressure, Defense Minister Moshe Dayan was brought into the Cabinet — his appointment immediately transformed public confidence. The question was no longer whether Israel would fight, but when.

The US urged restraint. President Johnson was consumed by Vietnam. He promised to 'pursue vigorously' efforts to break the naval blockade but nothing happened. Israel's cabinet met and decided: they could not wait for American action that was not coming. The order was given for dawn strikes on June 5.

That night, Israeli pilots slept in their cockpits. On airfields across the country, the most precisely planned air operation in Israeli history waited for morning.