Suez Crisis · 1956
The Suez Crisis (1956) was the last campaign of European imperial war and the first campaign of the Cold War's proxy competition — fought with World War II-era weapons in a post-war political framework neither Britain nor France understood. The Anglo-French-Israeli military campaign was tactically effective: Israel destroyed the Egyptian army in Sinai in 100 hours; Anglo-French airborne and amphibious forces seized the Canal Zone in a textbook combined-arms operation. But the weapons of diplomacy — American economic pressure, Soviet nuclear threats, and UN condemnation — defeated the military campaign before it could be consolidated. Suez demonstrated that military superiority alone cannot achieve political objectives when the political framework has shifted underneath the combatants.
The Hawker Hunter was the Royal Air Force's primary swept-wing jet fighter in 1956 — a transonic fighter-bomber that conducted the air campaign against Egyptian airfields, radar stations, and military installations during Operation Musketeer. Operating from Cyprus and aircraft carriers, Hunters and Canberras destroyed most of the Egyptian Air Force on the ground in the operation's opening 48 hours, achieving air superiority before the amphibious landings. The air campaign was conducted with considerable accuracy by the standards of the era — specifically targeting military infrastructure to minimize civilian casualties and maintain international support.
Significance
The Anglo-French air campaign succeeded militarily and failed politically. By destroying Egypt's air force without inflicting the civilian casualties that would have united Arab opinion, the operation actually made Nasser look better internationally — a leader who survived imperial attack. The restraint that made the campaign more ethical also deprived it of the shock effect that might have rapidly ended Egyptian resistance. The lesson — that limited war requires either decisive force or political support to succeed — was ignored by Western planners for decades.
The AMX-13 was a French light tank armed with a 75mm gun — too light for main battle tank combat but fast and agile enough for the rapid exploitation missions of the Sinai campaign. Israel used AMX-13s alongside Shermans in the assault on Egyptian positions in Gaza and Sinai. The AMX-13's oscillating turret with autoloader allowed a small crew of three to maintain a high rate of fire. In the flat terrain of Sinai, speed and firepower mattered more than protection — Israeli light armor moved faster than Egyptian heavy tanks could react.
Significance
The AMX-13's performance in Sinai established the French arms relationship with Israel that would define Israeli military capability through the 1960s. France was Israel's primary arms supplier in this period — providing fighters (Ouragans, Mystères, Mirages), tanks (AMX-13s), and warships — in a partnership built on anti-Nasser politics and Cold War calculation. The relationship ended abruptly when de Gaulle imposed an arms embargo in 1967, forcing Israel to develop its own arms industry.
The Anglo-French airborne assault on Port Said (November 5, 1956) was the largest British airborne operation since Arnhem — 600 paratroops from 3 Para dropped on Gamil airfield, followed by French paratroops at Port Fuad. The assault was preceded by naval gunfire and carrier-based air strikes that silenced Egyptian coastal defenses. Paratroopers secured the airfield within hours, and amphibious landings the following day rapidly extended the lodgment. Militarily, the operation worked — Port Said fell in 24 hours and the canal corridor was opening. The ceasefire was ordered by Britain that same evening under American pressure.
Significance
The ceasefire that halted the militarily successful operation became the defining humiliation of postwar British foreign policy. The paratroops who had just captured Port Said were ordered to stop at the moment of operational success, then withdraw over the following months while having gained nothing. The disconnect between military success and political outcome — the U.S. threatening to withdraw IMF support for sterling, effectively breaking Britain economically — demonstrated that military power without diplomatic backing had become insufficient for great power action.
Israel's primary battle tank in 1956 was the M4 Sherman — a WWII-era medium tank upgraded with the French 75mm high-velocity gun (later the 105mm) and improved engine. The 'Super Sherman' was not competitive with Soviet T-54s on paper — thinner armor, slower, and less powerful gun. But Israel compensated with superior crew training, night fighting tactics, and operational tempo that Egyptian tank crews could not match. In the 100-hour Sinai campaign, Israeli Shermans destroyed T-34 and T-54 tanks in engagements where Israeli initiative and tactical skill overcame equipment disadvantages.
Significance
Israel's use of improved WWII surplus weapons against modern Soviet-supplied Egyptian armor established a principle that Israeli defense planners would repeatedly validate: crew quality and tactical innovation can overcome equipment inferiority. The experience drove Israel's relentless post-Suez pursuit of modern weapons from France — Mirages, AMX-13 replacements, better artillery — and laid the groundwork for the weapons that won 1967's even more decisive victory.