Hundred Years' · 1337–1453
The Hundred Years' War bridged the end of the medieval and the dawn of the early modern age of warfare. It began with the supremacy of the English longbow — a weapon that shattered French chivalry at Crécy, Poitiers, and Agincourt — and ended with the triumph of gunpowder artillery, which made both the longbow and the castle obsolete. Over 116 years, the war saw the zenith and eclipse of armored mounted cavalry, the first decisive use of field artillery, the development of professional standing armies, and the systematic transformation of castle-based feudal defense into something that could be demolished in days. The weapons of 1337 and the weapons of 1453 tell the story of an entire era changing.
The English longbow was a self bow approximately six feet in length, made from a single stave of yew wood combining the compression resistance of the heartwood with the tension strength of the sapwood. It required years of training to use effectively — the skeletons of English archers show characteristic spinal deformations from decades of drawing 100–180 pound bows. A trained archer could loose ten to twelve aimed arrows per minute at ranges up to 300 yards. At Crécy, Poitiers, and Agincourt, massed longbow fire — thousands of arrows per minute from formations of hundreds of archers — created impenetrable walls of projectiles that armored horses and men could not survive. The weapon was a national institution: English law required all men to practice archery on Sundays.
Significance
The longbow was the decisive weapon of the war's first phase and one of the most consequential military technologies of the medieval period. It proved that disciplined ranged infantry fire could shatter armored cavalry — the dominant military force of the previous five centuries — and prefigured the infantry firepower revolution that gunpowder would complete.
The crossbow was the primary ranged weapon of French and allied forces, often wielded by Genoese mercenary specialists. A mechanical bow mounted on a stock, it was spanned (drawn) using a stirrup and hook or a windlass, generating enormous power with minimal user training. The steel-bow crossbows used by the Genoese at Crécy could penetrate armor at close range. However, their rate of fire — two to three bolts per minute compared to the longbow's ten — was dramatically inferior. At Crécy, when the Genoese crossbowmen advanced in wet weather with their strings affected by rain (longbow strings were kept dry under the archers' hats), they were overrun by French knights before they could effectively engage.
Significance
The crossbow-versus-longbow contrast at Crécy defined early English advantages in the war. The crossbow's slow rate of fire could not compete with mass longbow volleys in open field engagements. The Genoese at Crécy were also advancing uphill into the sun with wet bowstrings — conditions that exposed the crossbow's limitations. The bow remained standard in continental armies because it required less training than the longbow.
The fourteenth and fifteenth centuries saw the development of full plate armor from the earlier mail-and-plate combinations. By 1400, a wealthy knight might wear a full harness of articulated steel plate covering every part of his body, custom fitted to allow surprisingly free movement. A full harness weighed 40–60 pounds — similar to a modern soldier's combat load — and was designed to deflect sword cuts and lance thrusts. However, it was increasingly vulnerable to longbow bodkin arrows at close range, heavy blunt weapons such as pole-axes, and the simple problem that armored men who fell in mud (as at Agincourt) could not rise without help.
Significance
The tension between plate armor's growing sophistication and the weapons deployed to defeat it drove medieval military technology for the entire war. At Agincourt, the mud of a plowed field neutralized the armor of French knights more decisively than the arrows — men who fell could not stand up and were killed where they lay. Plate armor grew heavier and more specialized through the war, but was rendered obsolete by gunpowder within a generation of the war's end.
The destrier was the great warhorse of medieval chivalry — a large, powerful stallion bred and trained specifically for battle. Standing 15–16 hands and weighing over 1,200 pounds, the destrier was itself protected by armor (barding) covering its head, neck, and flanks. Knight and horse together represented an enormous investment — a destrier might cost the equivalent of years of a craftsman's wages. The combination of armored horse and armored rider at speed was one of the most formidable forces on the medieval battlefield. At Crécy, however, English arrows killed horses as readily as riders, and fallen horses created impassable obstacles for subsequent charges.
Significance
The destrier was the symbol and instrument of chivalric warfare. Its vulnerability to massed archery — horses are vastly larger targets than men and could not be fully armored — was one of the principal reasons why English longbowmen could defeat French armies many times their size. Dead and wounded horses at Crécy and Poitiers created literal walls of flesh that blocked subsequent charges.
The pike — a long thrusting spear of 12–21 feet — was the primary weapon for infantry holding ground against cavalry. Pikemen formed dense formations with overlapping pike heads that horses would not charge into. At Formigny and Castillon, French infantry used pikes in combination with artillery to create combined-arms formations that the English could not overcome. The shorter spear was used in individual combat and by soldiers who could not afford or carry a full pike.
Significance
Pike formations were essential to the French military reform of the 1440s that ended the war. Combined with artillery to keep archers away and cavalry to pursue broken units, the pike square was one of the foundational tactical innovations of the later Middle Ages, eventually evolving into the pike-and-shot formations that dominated European warfare for the next two centuries.
The bombard was the primary siege artillery of the later Hundred Years' War — a massive, short-barreled cannon firing stone balls weighing 100–400 pounds at castle walls. Early bombards were cast in bronze or forged in iron with hoops, and were slow to reload and prone to exploding. By the 1430s–1440s, the Bureau brothers had systematized bombard production and deployment for Charles VII, creating standardized ammunition and reliable cannon that could reduce any castle in days rather than weeks. The great bombard 'Mons Meg' (c. 1449) is among the surviving examples of this class.
Significance
The bombard made the stone castle, which had been the foundation of feudal military power for three centuries, militarily obsolete within a generation. English-held castles in Normandy fell to Bureau's bombards one after another in 1449–1450. A fortress that had been considered impregnable against conventional siege could now be reduced in days — ending the feudal defensive system that had protected noble power across Europe.
The culverin was a longer, lighter cannon than the bombard, designed for field use rather than siege. Jean Bureau deployed culverins at the Battle of Formigny (1450) to devastating effect: positioned on the flanks of the English defensive line, they fired iron balls into the archers' positions, forcing them to abandon their stakes and charge the guns. At Castillon (1453), Bureau's artillery camp contained approximately 300 guns of various types, including culverins that created an impenetrable wall of fire that destroyed Talbot's charging force.
Significance
The culverin was the weapon that defeated the English longbow. By forcing archers out of their defensive positions with flanking artillery fire, Bureau solved the tactical problem that French commanders had failed to crack for a century. The culverin's field deployment at Formigny and Castillon announced the modern combined-arms battle.
The pavise was a large rectangular shield, typically 4–5 feet tall, used primarily by crossbowmen to provide cover while reloading their slow-firing weapons. Pavise shields were carried by a specialist assistant called a pavisier, who held the shield in front of the crossbowman while he spanned (drew) his bow — a process requiring both hands and taking 30–60 seconds. Crossbow companies in French armies invariably included paired crossbowmen and pavisiers working together.
Significance
The pavise represented the logistical overhead required to field crossbowmen effectively — each crossbowman essentially required a second soldier for protection. English longbowmen needed no such assistant, which partly explains why English armies of the same size could field more effective archers. The pavise was standard in continental armies throughout the war.
The longsword — a double-edged sword of 40–48 inches with a hand-and-a-half grip — was the primary sidearm of armored men-at-arms on both sides. The arming sword (single-handed, 30–36 inches) was more common among soldiers who needed a free hand for a shield. Both were used in close combat after the arrows had done their work. At Agincourt, English men-at-arms and archers who had thrown down their bows fought in the press with swords, knives, and mallets — killing the heavily armored French knights who had fallen in the mud.
Significance
The sword was the symbol of knighthood and the primary close-quarters weapon of the entire war. By Agincourt, however, heavily armored opponents required specialized techniques — thrusting into visors and armpit gaps, or using the sword as a lever to wrestle opponents to the ground — rather than simple cutting blows. The evolution of sword use mirrors the evolution of armor.
The halberd was a pole weapon combining an axe blade, a spear point, and a hook on a 5–7 foot shaft. The pole-axe was a heavier variation used specifically against heavily armored opponents — its hammer face could dent or deform armor, its spike could penetrate visors, and its hook could pull riders from horses. At Agincourt, English and French men-at-arms fought in the mud with pole-axes, and the weapon was considered the premier instrument of armored combat by the late fourteenth century.
Significance
The halberd and pole-axe solved the problem of defeating plate armor in close combat: blunt trauma, penetration of weak points, and levering. Their development paralleled the evolution of full plate armor and represents the arms race between protection and offense that ran through the entire war.
The couched lance — held under the arm and braced against the body — was the primary weapon of armored cavalry charges throughout the war. At 10–14 feet long, the lance concentrated the momentum of horse and rider into a narrow point, capable of penetrating armor or hurling opponents from their feet. French knights at Crécy, Poitiers, and Agincourt led their charges with leveled lances. The weapon's effectiveness depended entirely on the cavalry reaching its target — which English longbowmen consistently prevented.
Significance
The lance was the defining weapon of chivalric warfare, and its failure against English archery was the defining tactical lesson of the war's first century. At Crécy, lances were useless against archers a hundred yards away who were shooting ten arrows per minute. The gradual abandonment of massed lance charges in favor of dismounted fighting and artillery reflected the lance's obsolescence against missile weapons.
The hand cannon — an early predecessor of the arquebus and musket — appeared on European battlefields during the Hundred Years' War, particularly in its later phases. It was a simple metal tube, often mounted on a wooden stock or pole, loaded with gunpowder and a stone or iron ball and ignited with a slow match. Accuracy was poor, rate of fire extremely slow, and the weapon was liable to explode in the operator's hands. By the 1440s–1450s, hand cannons were appearing in French forces alongside conventional bows.
Significance
The hand cannon of the Hundred Years' War was militarily marginal but historically pivotal — it was the ancestor of every personal firearm that followed. Its presence in the war's later battles points toward the world that was coming: one where infantry firepower would be provided by gunpowder, not muscle, and the longbow's era would be brief in the long history of warfare.
How the weapons and tactics of Hundred Years' changed the nature of warfare.
Jean and Gaspard Bureau, brothers employed as masters of artillery by Charles VII in the 1440s, transformed gunpowder cannon from expensive curiosities into a systematic instrument of military power. They standardized ammunition calibers, developed reliable casting and forging techniques, organized artillery trains with professional gun crews, and — most importantly — pioneered the tactical use of field artillery as a combat arm rather than purely a siege tool. At Formigny, Bureau deployed culverins to enfilade the English longbow line, forcing the archers to charge the guns. At Castillon, he fortified an artillery camp with 300 cannon that destroyed an entire English army in minutes.
Legacy
English commanders developed a distinctive tactical doctrine for maximizing the longbow's potential: choose strong defensive ground (preferably a ridge or slope), anchor the flanks on natural obstacles (woods, marshes, rivers), place armored men-at-arms in the center to hold the line, and position archers on the flanks in 'herce' (harrow) formations to deliver converging fire into advancing enemies. Stakes driven into the ground protected the archers from cavalry. The formula was consistent across Crécy, Poitiers, and Agincourt — and consistently devastating.
Legacy
The chevauchée was a strategic doctrine of mounted raiding through enemy territory — burning crops, villages, and towns; seizing livestock; destroying mills and infrastructure — designed to undermine a ruler's authority by demonstrating his inability to protect his subjects, damage his economic base, and force him to give battle on unfavorable terms or accept the humiliation of passivity. English armies under Edward III and the Black Prince conducted chevauchées across France on a massive scale, devastating entire regions of Normandy, Brittany, and the south.
Legacy
The Free Companies — routiers or écorcheurs ('skinners') in French — were bands of unemployed professional soldiers who devastated France between the major truces of the war, living by plunder since they had no other employers. They were the unintended consequence of creating a class of professional warriors through decades of war: men who knew no other trade and would sell their services (or their restraint from violence) to whoever paid. They were internationally recruited — English, Gascon, Breton, German, Spanish — and operated as independent military enterprises.
Legacy
Charles VII's military ordinances of 1445 created the compagnies d'ordonnance — the first permanent, professional cavalry companies in Western European history. Unlike feudal levies (summoned for specific campaigns and expensive to maintain), or Free Companies (unreliable and predatory), the compagnies d'ordonnance were permanent royal units on continuous contract, standardized in organization, regularly paid from royal taxation, and subject to royal discipline. Simultaneously, Charles established the francs-archers — a royal infantry reserve of 8,000 archers who trained regularly in peacetime.
Legacy